Showing posts with label cost of deposits. Show all posts
Showing posts with label cost of deposits. Show all posts

Friday, 27 March 2015

Perception Versus Reality: Do People Get More From Credit Unions Than Banks?

The Credit Union National Association (CUNA), the credit union equivalent to the American Bankers' Association (ABA), states that credit unions exist to serve members, returning earnings to members in the form of lower loan rates, higher interest on deposits, and lower fees.

Nearly four years ago, I tested the higher interest on deposits claim in a guest post with the exact title on The Financial Brand, an industry publication geared towards marketing executives at banks and credit unions. The reaction that I received, in person, via e-mail, and in the comments were a little sharp-edged. Clearly this remains an emotional issue.

When the going gets tough, go to the facts. In 2011, banks paid higher interest on their interest bearing deposits than credit unions throughout the measurement period. 

When I re-ran the analysis, what was true back in 2011 still holds true (see chart).

There is a difference in my analytics. I searched on banks and credit unions between $500 million and $5 billion in total assets. I took a wider swath in 2011 with institutions between $100 million and $10 billion. Today's analysis reduced the amount of very small financial institutions.

I continued to control for commercially oriented banks by limiting to banks with less than 30% commercial real estate or commercial business loans as a percent of total loans. Those banks tend to have higher level of business deposits, which tend to drive down cost of deposits. However, to further control for this, I only selected interest expense as a percent of interest bearing deposits, not counting checking accounts that pay no interest.

Based on the above, for the sum total of all interest bearing deposits, banks pay higher rates, on average.

Surprisingly, changing the institution size did tell a different story in non-interest expense to average assets, or what is termed the expense ratio (see chart).

Perhaps the financial crisis, which credit unions survived surprisingly well with the exception of corporate credit unions (similar to bankers' banks), woke up credit union leadership to scrutinize operating expense to increase profits. 

Yes, you read profits. Where do you think credit unions get their capital? If credit unions suffered a similar fate to many community banks, they couldn't back up the truck for shareholders to pony up equity to help absorb losses. Becoming more profitable was the logical solution to building up capital positions.

There are probably other reasons at work. In 2011, those expense ratios for credit unions were in the fours (greater than 4%). That was likely due to my going down to institutions with $100 million in assets. While I did the same for banks, many smaller banks are privately owned, one branch operations with very low expense ratios. By raising the bar to $500 million, my analysis likely raised bank expense ratios by excluding those hyper-efficient small banks, and reduced credit union expense ratios by eliminating very small, inefficient institutions.

As the charts show, there is little difference in expense ratios, on average, for the measured institutions. 

I think both trend charts show something that previously happened between thrifts, savings banks, and commercial banks: the homogenization of business models. In the late 1990's, many traditional thrifts entered commercial banking with both feet. The result is falling net interest margins for banks and rising net interest margins for thrifts, long term. Thrift expense ratios began to rise as they took on the more expensive commercial banking teams.

Credit unions are shedding their Select Employer Group (SEG) strategies by adopting community charters or by adding so many SEGs that nearly everyone qualifies to join. They have entered commercial banking to the extent permissible by their regulators. So I expect financial performance ratios to begin looking more and more like their bank competitors.

Except for the shareholders. And the taxes.

Do you thing credit union and bank business models getting more similar?

~ Jeff

Monday, 6 January 2014

What is the better banking strategy: low expense v low deposit costs?

Here is a question that dogs us: should we follow a strategy that drives top quartile performance in operating expenses or cost of deposits? If your answer is "yes", your execution better be flawless. Because the two don't often go together. In my search, described below, only one bank made top quartile performance in both categories.

The low operating expense bank typically comes with a limited branch network. Bank futurists think this a good thing since branches are millstones around our collective necks. So in order to attract deposits, these banks tend to use premium rates to get people comfortable with not having a nearby branch. 

Low expense banks tend not to have sophisticated commercial banking operations too. Preferring instead to focus on residential real estate lending combined with transactional commercial real estate lending. By transactional, I mean the bank may resort to price to get deals, and not extensive customer relationships, as many of these customers don't value relationships anyway.

Conversely, low cost of deposit banks tend to have more expansive branch networks to get core retail and business account balances. Anecdotally, the most often heard reason a business customer objects to opening an operating account at a bank is because it lacks a nearby branch. But, admittedly, that could just be an objection that is not the "real reason".

Also, low cost of deposit banks tend to be heavy commercial lenders, both commercial real estate and business loans. That requires a good product set, and lots of resources. Asset-based lending requires much greater borrower interaction than plain vanilla commercial real estate lending.

So which strategy results in better performance? I went to the numbers (see table), and it's tough to tell.


I searched for banks of a certain size ($1B - $20B in assets) to eliminate trading anomalies from very large and very small banks. I also controlled for capital levels and asset quality to limit the number of factors impacting pricing. 

The picture is not totally clear on which strategy delivers the better returns or higher trading multiples. To be sure, both sets of top quartile banks are well run and rewarded with relatively high trading multiples. And they have delivered very good results, as indicated by their 3-year price changes.

So, which one is better? I think it depends on each financial institution's individual circumstances. Do you operate in slow to no growth markets? Perhaps a low operating expense/cash cow strategy is appropriate. 

Is your FI in business-rich markets and your niche is concierge-like service to tech firms? Well the low cost deposit strategy with higher expense ratios may be appropriate. 

Whatever strategy you choose, I implore you... to choose. The zigging and zagging, the all things to all people, the yes, yes, and yes strategies are misallocating resources and driving our financial institutions into homogenized and commoditized, irrelevant, soon to be sold and quickly forgotten memories that our 7,000 brethren that have been sold since the early '90's have become.

Are we going to let it happen?

~ Jeff


Sunday, 13 March 2011

Core Deposits Drive Value

The title of this post is common community FI phraseology. I hear it often, and use it often. My epiphany came when I performed research for a client that subscribed to the Return on Equity school of thinking. This FI had a high percentage of funding coming from CD's and FHLB borrowings, a relatively low loan to deposit ratio, and focused on generating profits within the investment portfolio.

The FI performed very well on an ROE basis. Its relatively low net interest margin, due to high funding costs and low yield on earning assets, was more than offset by very low operating costs. The FIs CEO lamented at his low trading multiples. I decided to dig into why his multiples were so low. It turned out that the best indicator for trading at high multiples was a low cost of deposits. I performed this research about ten years ago.

Dial forward to today and I decided to test again if the cost of deposits as value driver is still true. The results are in the table below. I searched for profitable banks & thrifts with at least 1,000 daily trading volume that had non-performing assets to assets less than 3%. The search yielded 101 banks and 30 thrifts. Not a large number but in order to get reasonable values I had to control for inefficient trading and asset quality.

Banks in the top quartile (best) cost of deposits traded at a 17.4% premium to bottom quartile performers in price to earnings multiples and a 35.5% premium in price to tangible book multiples.

Thrifts top quartile performers traded at an 18.9% and 30.2% premium on price to earnings and price to tangible book, respectively.

But could this be relating to their margin or yield on earning assets? I tested for yield on earning assets and the answer was no, there was no positive correlation between trading multiples and yield on earning assets.

There are imperfections to this analysis, though. Upon review, larger banks with greater trading volume also trade at higher multiples. This is probably the result of a greater pool of institutional investors due to volume requirements. Additionally, although trading multiples are beginning to show signs of improving, the overall trading of the banking sector has not returned to normal.

But ten years ago my analysis demonstrated that FIs with better deposit mixes and therefore lower cost of deposits enjoyed greater valuations. And today, the results are very similar. So why do so many FIs doggedly stick to asset-based business strategies?  Some, such as Sandy Spring Bancorp (see slide below), have been generating value from the liability side of their balance sheet and continue to do so.

According to Sandy Spring's latest investor presentation, the bank pursues a "strategic focus on small business, middle market and affluent retail customer relationships". Anecdotally, most small and mid-sized businesses do not borrow. So serving them, one would think, would require a focus on deposit relationships.

It appears as though Sandy Spring is winning, having 23% of their deposits in non-interest bearing DDAs and a cost of deposits of 0.49% in the fourth quarter. They trade at a 16.2x earnings multiple and at 130% of tangible book. It should be noted that Sandy Spring is headquartered in Maryland, a state that has experienced its fair share of credit challenges, hence the relatively low price to tangible book multiple from other top quartile banks.

Do you believe core deposits drive value? If so, why, and if not, why not?

~ Jeff

Special note: I am not making stock recommendations here. So don't call your broker to make a trade based on what I write. If you saw the performance of my stock portfolio, you would know what I mean.


Disclosure: My company has served as a strategic advisor to Sandy Spring within the past twelve months.